ပဋိပကၡေျဖရွင္းရန္ အၾကံျပဳခ်က္မ်ား
ေတာင္တရုတ္ပင္လယ္အျငင္းပြားမွဳ
(၁) ယံုၾကည္မွဳတည္ေဆာက္ျခင္း နည္းလမ္းမ်ား
ပညာရွင္အမ်ားစုက တိုက္ရိုက္ပါ၀င္ပတ္သက္ေနတဲ့ ႏိုင္ငံမ်ားအၾကားမွာ
ယံုၾကည္မွဳတည္ေဆာက္ျခင္း နည္းလမ္းမ်ား (confidence building measures) အသံုးျပဳသင့္ေၾကာင္း
အဆိုျပဳထားၾကပါတယ္။ ရည္ရြယ္ခ်က္မ်ားကို ရွင္းလင္းစြာ ေဖာ္ျပျခင္း၊
မွားယြင္းတြက္ခ်က္မွဳမ်ားကို ေလွ်ာ့ခ်ျခင္းနဲ႕ ပြင့္လင္း ျမင္သာမွဳရွိျခင္းတို႕ေၾကာင့္
စစ္ေရးပဋိပကၡ ျဖစ္ပြားႏိုင္ေခ် ေလ်ာ့နည္းႏိုင္ေၾကာင္း တြက္ခ်က္ထားၾက ပါတယ္။ အခ်ိဳ႕ပညာရွင္ေတြကေတာ့
အျငင္းပြားမွဳျဖစ္ပြားရာေနရာေတြ
ပညာရွင္မ်ားအဆိုျပဳထားတဲ့ အျခားနည္းလမ္းေတြကေတာ့
maritime သတင္းအခ်က္အလက္ဆိုင္ရာ စင္တာမ်ား တည္ေဆာက္ျခင္း၊ ပင္လယ္ေရေၾကာင္း
လံုျခံဳေရးအတြက္ ပူးေပါင္းေဆာင္ရြက္ရန္ ခ်ဥ္းကပ္နည္းလမ္းမ်ား ေဖာ္ေဆာင္ျခင္း၊
disaster relief ျပဳလုပ္ရန္ နည္းလမ္းမ်ား ေဖာ္ထုတ္ျခင္းႏွင့္ ပူးေပါင္းေဆာင္ရြက္ေရးဇံုမ်ား
တည္ေထာင္ျခင္း စတာေတြ ျဖစ္ပါတယ္။ အျခားေရေၾကာင္း အျငင္းပြားမွဳေတြမွာ အသံုးျပဳတဲ့
နည္းလမ္းေတြျဖစ္တဲ့ စစ္ေရးေလ့က်င့္မွဳႏွင့္ လွဳပ္ရွားမွဳမ်ား မျပဳလုပ္ခင္မွာ ၾကိဳတင္အေၾကာင္းၾကားေရး၊
ေရတပ္စခန္းဌာနခ်ဳပ္မ်ားသို႕ အျပန္အလွန္ ေလ့လာေရး ခရီးစဥ္မ်ား ထားရွိေရး၊
ေရတပ္ပူးတြဲေလ့က်င့္မွဳမ်ားျပဳ
(၂) Multilateral Efforts
လက္ရွိအေျခအေနမွာ ပဋိပကၡေျဖရွင္းေရးအတြက္ ASEAN
Regional Forum (ARF) နဲ႕ Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP)
တို႕က Multilateral Efforts အေနနဲ႕ ၾကိဳးပမ္းထားၾကပါတယ္။ ဒါေပမယ့္ တရုတ္က
ေတာင္တရုတ္ပင္လယ္အေရးကိစၥေတြ အစည္းအေ၀း အာဂ်င္ဒါေတြမွာ မပါေရးအတြက္ အစြမ္းကုန္ ၾကိဳးစားခဲ့ပါတယ္။
Bilateral initiatives ေတြအေနနဲ႕ တရုတ္နဲ႕ ဖိလစ္ပိုင္တို႕အၾကား၊ ဖိလစ္ပိုင္နဲ႕
ဗီယက္နမ္တို႕အၾကား ၾကိဳးပမ္းမွဳေတြလဲ ရွိပါတယ္။ သို႕ေပမယ့္ တရုတ္က
အသိအမွတ္မျပဳသမွ် Multilateral Efforts ေတြနဲ႕ Bilateral initiatives ေတြက အက်ိဳးေက်းဇူးျဖစ္ထြန္းမွာ
မဟုတ္ေၾကာင္း အဆိုျပဳထားၾကပါတယ္။
(၄) ပူးေပါင္းေဆာင္ရြက္မွဳ
အျငင္းပြားမွဳ ျဖစ္ပြားရာ ေရပိုင္နက္နဲ႕ ပတ္သက္တဲ့
အေရးကိစၥေတြမွာ ပူးေပါင္းေဆာင္ရြက္မွဳ ျပဳလုပ္ျခင္း အားျဖင့္ ပဋိပကၡျဖစ္ပြားတဲ့
ႏိုင္ငံမ်ားအၾကား ယံုၾကည္မွဳတည္ေဆာက္လို႕ရႏိုင္ေၾ
(၅) Demilitarization Initiatives
အျငင္းပြားမွဳျဖစ္ပြားရာေရပိုင္
(၆) code of conduct
ေတာင္တရုတ္ပင္လယ္မွာ တိက်တဲ့ code of conduct ေတြခ်မွတ္ဖို႕
အဆိုျပဳခ်က္ေတြလဲ ရွိပါတယ္။ CSCAP ကထုတ္ထားတဲ့ The "Guidelines for Regional
Maritime Cooperation" ကို စံနမူနာအျဖစ္ က်င့္သံုးသင့္ေၾကာင္း အၾကံျပဳထားၾကပါတယ္။
(၇) eminent persons group and third party
negotiation
အာဆီယံႏိုင္ငံမဟုတ္တဲ့ အျခားႏိုင္ငံမ်ားက
ကိုယ္စားလွယ္မ်ား စုစည္းျပီး ေတာင္တရုတ္ပင္လယ္ဆိုင္ရာ "eminent persons
group" တခု တည္ေထာင္ဖို႕ အၾကံျပဳခ်က္မ်ားလဲ ရွိပါတယ္။ ဒီလိုအုပ္စု ရွိျခင္းအားျဖင့္
အေတြးအေခၚသစ္မ်ား ေပးႏိုင္ရံုသာမက third party negotiation ကိုလဲ အေကာင္
အထည္ေဖာ္ႏိုင္ေၾကာင္း ဆိုထားၾကပါတယ္။
(၈) "Lines in the Sand" သတ္မွတ္ျခင္း
အေမရိကန္ႏိုင္ငံအပါအ၀င္ တျခားဘယ္ႏိုင္ငံကမွ ေတာင္တရုတ္ပင္လယ္
အျငင္းပြားေရပိုင္နက္အေရးနဲ႕ ပတ္သက္ျပီး "Lines in the Sand" ကို ကြဲကြဲျပားျပား
မသိၾကပါဘူး။ ဘာမွန္းမသိတဲ့အတြက္ ေျဖရွင္းဖို႕နည္းလမ္းကို ရွာဖို႕အလြန္ခဲယဥ္းပါတယ္။
ဒါေၾကာင့္ ဘယ္လို လွဳပ္ရွားမွဳဟာ တိုက္ရိုက္ပါ၀င္ ပတ္သက္တဲ့ ႏိုင္ငံရဲ႕
အခ်ဳပ္အျခာအာဏာ (သို႕မဟုတ္) အက်ိဳးစီးပြားကို ထိခိုက္ႏိုင္တယ္ဆိုတာ သိရွိဖို႕အတြက္
candid dialogue ေတြ ျပဳလုပ္ျပီး "Lines in the Sand" သတ္မွတ္ဖို႕လိုေၾကာင္း
အၾကံျပဳခ်က္ေတြလဲ ရွိပါတယ္။
(၉) အေမရိကန္ျပည္ေထာင္စု၏ Forward Military
Presence နည္းဗ်ဴဟာ
အာဆီယံႏိုင္ငံအခ်ိဳ႕ရဲ႕ ပညာရွင္မ်ားကေတာ့ ေတာင္တရုတ္ပင္လယ္အေရးမွာ
အေမရိကန္ျပည္ေထာင္စု အေနနဲ႕ Forward Military Presence နည္းဗ်ဴဟာက်င့္သံုးေပးျခင္းအားျ
နိဂံုး
ေတာင္တရုတ္ပင္လယ္အေရးနဲ႕ ပတ္သက္ျပီး
အျဖစ္သင့္ဆံုးအေျဖကေတာ့ တိုက္ရိုက္ပါ၀င္ ပတ္သက္ေနတဲ့ ႏိုင္ငံမ်ားအေနနဲ႕ သူတို႕အဆိုျပဳခ်က္ေတြကို
ျပန္လည္သံုးသပ္ျပီး ပူးေပါင္း ေဆာင္ရြက္ေရး၊ အေပးအယူျပဳလုပ္ေရး၊ ေစ့စပ္ေဆြးေႏြးေရးေတြ
ျပဳလုပ္ဖို႕ပဲ ျဖစ္ပါတယ္။ ပါ၀င္ပတ္သက္ေနတဲ့ ႏိုင္ငံမ်ားအေနနဲ႕ စစ္ေရးနည္းလမ္းနဲ႕ ျပႆနာေျဖရွင္းမွဳဟာ
ပါ၀င္တဲ့ႏိုင္ငံေတြကို သာမက အျခားႏိုင္ငံမ်ားကိုပါ စစ္ပြဲထဲ
ဆြဲသြင္းရာေရာက္ႏိုင္ေၾကာင္း ပကတိအေျခအေနကို တြက္ဆျပီး၊ ျငိမ္းခ်မ္းစြာေျဖရွင္းႏိုင္ေရး
ခင္မမမ်ိဳး (၄၊ ၁၁၊ ၂၀၁၂)
ရည္ညႊန္းကိုးကား။ ။
Acharya, A. (2010) ‘China
Southeast Asia: Security Aspects’ in K.Santhanam and Srikanth Kondapalli
(eds.), Asian Security and China
2000‐2010, Delhi:
Shipra Publication.
Auslin, M. (2010) “Security in the Indo-Pacific
Commons: Toward a Regional Strategy”, American Enterprise Institute, December
2010.
ASEAN‐China Dialogue Relations (2012), http://www.aseansec.org/5874.
Bacon, L. (2010) “Deep Dive: Self-Inflicted
Attack Sub Cuts Cripple America’s Sea Superiority,” Armed Forces Journal, May
2010.
Baker, J.and David G. Wiencek (2002) Cooperative
Monitoring in the South China Sea: Satellite Imagery, Confidence-Building
Measures, and the Spratly Islands Disputes, Westport, CT:
Praeger
Bateman, S. and Ralf Emmers (eds.) Security and
International Politics in the South China Sea: Towards a Cooperative Management
Regime, New York:
Routledge.
Cheng, D. (2011) “Sea Power and the Chinese State:
China’s
Maritime Ambitions” , Heritage Foundation, July 11, 2011.
Chi K.(1989) China Policy towards Territorial
Disputes the case of South China Sea Island, London:
Routledge Press.
Djalal, H. (1996) "Territorial Disputes at
Sea: Situation, Possibilities, Prognosis," presented at the 10th
Asia-Pacific Roundtable, Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia, June
5-8, 1996.
Dutton, P. (2011) “Three Disputes and Three
Objectives: China and the South China Sea,”
Naval War
College Review, 64 no. 4
, pp. 42-67.
Fravel, M. (2008) Strong Borders, Secure Nation:
Cooperation and Conflict in China’s
Territorial Disputes, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
Fravel, M. (2011) “China’s
Strategy in the South China Sea,” Contemporary
Southeast Asia, no.3, December 2011.
Garver, J. (1992) “China’s Push Through the South
China Sea”, The China Quarterly, No. 132, December 1992.
Gomez, J. (2011) “U.S.
Vows Second Warship for Philippines,”
Navy Times, November 17. http://www.navytimes.com/news/
Gurtov, M. and Byong-Moo Hwang (1998) China’s Security:
The New Roles of the Military, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Hernandez, C. and Cossa, R. (eds.) (1997)
Security Implications of Conflict in the South China Sea: Perspectives from
Asia-Pacific, Quezon City, Philippines: Institute for
Strategic and Development Studies.
Jiangming, S. (2002) “China’s
Sovereignty over the South China
Sea Islands:
a Historical Perspective”, Chinese Journal of International Law, vol.1, issue 1
2002, pp. 94-157.
Jennings, R. (2009) “Taiwan
Says China Has 1,500
Missiles Aimed at Island,” Reuters, February
13, 2009.
Ji, Y. (1997) "Security Implications of
Conflict in the South China Sea: A Chinese Perspective," in Hernandez and
Cossa (eds.) Security Implications of Conflict in the South China Sea:
Perspectives from Asia-Pacific, Quezon
City, Philippines:
Institute for Strategic and Development Studies.
Kaplan, R. (2010) “China’s
Caribbean,” The Washington Post, September 26,
2010.
Kaplan, R. (2011) “The South
China Sea Is the Future of Conflict,” Foreign Policy
(September/October 2011).
Kleine-Ahlbrandt, S. (2011) “Rocky times ahead
in South China Sea”, Global Post, 5 July 2011.
Keyuan, Z. (1999) “The Chinese traditional
maritime boundary line in the South China Sea and its legal consequences for
the resolution of the dispute over the Spratly Islands”, International Journal
of Marine Coastal Law, vol. 14, issue 1.
Lampton, D. (2001) “China’s Foreign and National
Security Policymaking Process: Is It Changing, and Does It Matter?”, in David
M. Lampton (ed.) The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era
of Reform, Stanford University Press.
Li, M. (2010) “Reconciling Assertiveness and
Cooperation? China’s
Changing Approach to the South China Sea Dispute,” Security Challenges, Winter
2010.
Pedrozo, R. (2009) “Close Encounters at Sea: The
USNS Impeccable Incident,” Naval War
College Review, 62 no. 3,
Summer 2009, pp. 101-111.
Pedrozo, R. (2011) “Beijing’s coastal real estate: a history of
Chinese naval aggression”, Foreign Policy, 15 November 2011.
Ruiz, J. (2010) “RP, Vietnam
Agree on Spratlys,” Manila Bulletin, October
28, 2010.
Rahman, C. & Martin Tsamenyi (2010) “A
Strategic Perspective on Security and Naval Issues in the South China Sea”,
Ocean Development & International Law, Special Issue: Issues in the South China Sea, vol. 41, Issue 4, 2010.
Shicun, W. (2009) Origin and development of
Spratly disputes, China Economic Publishing House.
Swaine, M. (2011) “China’s Assertive Behavior – Part
One: On ‘Core Interests,’” China Leadership Monitor, 34 , Winter 2011.
Swaine, M. and M. Taylor
Fravel (2011) “China’s
Assertive Behavior – Part Two: The Maritime Periphery,” China Leadership
Monitor, 35, Summer 2011.
Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, “America’s
Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy (November,2011).http://www.
Springut, M. (2009) ‘Managing China’s Growing
Assertiveness in the South China Sea’, World
Politics Review, 27 July 2009.
Storey, I. (2012) “China’s
bilateral and multilateral diplomacy in the South China Sea”, Cooperation from Strength:
United States, China and the South China
Sea, Centre for New
America Security, January 2012.
Storey, I. (2011) “China
and the Philippines:
Implications of the Reed Bank Incident”, China
Brief, vol. 11, no. 8, Jamestown
Foundation, 6 May 2011.
Thayer, C. (2011) ‘The Tyranny of Geography:
Vietnamese Strategies to Constrain China in the South China Sea’, paper
presented at the 52nd Annual Convention of International Studies
Association, Montreal, Quebec, 16–19 March 2011.
Thayer,C. (2010) ‘Recent Developments in the South China Sea: Grounds for Cautious Optimism?’, working
paper no. 220, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 14 December,
2010, http://www.rsis.edu.sg/
Torode, G. (2010) “Exercises Show PLA Navy’s
Strength,” South China Morning Post, April 18, 2010.
U.S. Department of defence (2011) Annual Report
to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic
of China
2011
Valencia, M. (1995) "China
and the South China Sea Disputes,"
Adelphi Paper 298, International Institute for Strategic Studies, October 1995.
Vatikiotis, M.(2003) ‘Catching the Dragon’s
Tail: China and Southeast Asia in the 21st Century’, Contemporary
Southeast Asia.
ျပိဳင္တူတြန္းလွ်င္ ေရႊ ့ႏိုင္သည္ ။
No comments:
Post a Comment